But why was its sanctuary not attacked before September 2001, in particular after the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998? Abou Zahab and Roy argue that this was because the Taliban was only part of a much wider radical Islamic network in the region, whose true centre was Pakistan, not Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Pakistani Deobandis, the IMU of Uzbekistan -- all these groups are based in Pakistan, which served, and serves, as the regional hub for Islamist movements and their terrorist offshoots. What is the history of this phenomenon? Above all, given their divergent histories and doctrinal rifts, how were these disparate Islamist movements slowly coordinated with the aim of attacking what became their common adversary, the United States? This book investigates and explains the almost 25-year gestation of these interlinked radical Islamist networks of Pakistan, Central Asia and Afghanistan, including the support they have received from Pakistan's Inter-Services-Intelligence agency (ISI).
